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AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO FIRST DEGREE
DEPRAVED MIND MURDER UNDER THE NEW MEXICO
CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, numerous cases have arisen in New Mexico courts where
the constitutionality of New Mexico's depraved mind murder formulation
of first degree murder could be challenged. For one reason or another,
the question has not been decided to this author's knowledge. Given that
the Supreme Court of New Mexico has recently acknowledged the in-
dependent force of the equal protection clause of the New Mexico Con-
stitution, it is an appropriate occasion to explore the reach of that
independence over an issue which involves substantial rights of persons
charged with depraved mind murder.
Under New Mexico's current murder statutes, the elements of depraved
mind murder and second degree murder are indistinguishable. While
depraved mind murder is a capital felony punishable by death or life
imprisonment, second degree murder is punishable by a maximum term
of twelve years imprisonment. Because these statutes proscribe the same
criminal conduct, people commiting identical criminal acts may be subject
to radically different penalties. New Mexico's courts have held that where
statutes allow law enforcement authorities to subject one person to the
possibility of greater punishment than another person who has committed
an identical criminal act, the Equal Protection Clauses of the New Mexico
and United States Constitutions are violated. The Supreme Court of the
United States has relatively recently expressed the view that such a sit-
uation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While this has undermined the holding of the New Mexico
cases insofar as they are based on the United States Constitution, the
cases still stand for the proposition that the equal protection clause of the
New Mexico Constitution prohibits such a situation.
This Comment begins by examining the elements of depraved mind
murder and second degree murder as explained by New Mexico case law,
demonstrating that the elements of these formulations of murder are in
effect identical. Next, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution is shown to be inadequate to offer protection from such a
situation as it is currently interpreted. Third, the Comment examines the
principles underlying the role of state constitutions as a source of pro-
tection independent of and supplemental to the United States Constitution,
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
and reviews the development of equal protection law as it is interpreted
under state constitutions. Next, the Comment presents an analysis of how
the equal protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution provides the
basis for invalidating New Mexico's depraved mind murder statute. Fi-
nally, the role of depraved mind murder in a statutory homicide scheme
is discussed, and the potential future of depraved mind murder in New
Mexico is explored.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER AND FIRST
DEGREE DEPRAVED MIND MURDER UNDER NEW MEXICO LAW
Depraved mind murder in New Mexico is a form of first degree murder.
The murder statute states in pertinent part:
A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by
another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means
with which death may be caused: . . . (3) by any act greatly dan-
gerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless
of human life.'
Second degree murder in New Mexico is defined in the same statute
which states in pertinent part:
B. . . . a person who kills another human being without lawful
justification or excuse, commits murder in the second degree if in
performing the acts which cause the death, he knows that such acts
create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that
individual or another.2
Generally, to subject a person to criminal liability for his conduct there
must be a concurrence of an unlawful act (actus reus) and a culpable
mental state (mens rea).3 To determine whether the elements of second
degree murder (SDM) and depraved mind murder (DMM) are indistin-
guishable, both the actus reus and mens rea elements of these crimes, as
established by statutory language and as further expounded by New Mex-
ico courts, must be examined. Beginning with the actus reus elements,
the statutory sections relating to DMM and SDM proscribe a particular
physical consequence. The physical consequence proscribed by both SDM
and DMM is the killing of another human being, and both statutory
sections proscibe such killing done without lawful justification or excuse.
Another actus reus element of both crimes relates to the act causing
death, and requires that the act create a specific degree of risk that death
would result to the victim. In the case of SDM this degree of risk is
. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1988) (emphasis added).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980).
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characterized as "a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." In
the case of DMM the degree of risk is characterized as "great danger-
ousness to the lives of others." To argue that the two crimes are indis-
tinguishable, it must be shown that the degree of risk creation referred
to by "great dangerousness to the lives of others" on the one hand, and
"strong probability of death or great bodily harm" on the other, is in
effect one and the same standard.
There is little case law explaining what is meant by "great danger-
ousness to the lives of others." In State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammed,4 the
court stated that the degree of risk creation necessary for DMM is a very
high degree of risk. The question is thus whether the very high degree
of risk necessary for DMM is distinguishable from the degree of risk
characterized by the words "strong probability of death or great bodily
harm." Although no New Mexico case has explained the degree of risk
referred to by the words "strong probability of death or great bodily
harm," the court in State v. Johnson, noting that "the elements of second
degree murder are somewhat similar to depraved mind murder," distin-
guished the two crimes not on the basis of the degree of risk creation,
but by the mens rea or mental culpability elements required of each.5
Because the distinction was drawn along these lines, Johnson can be read
as confirming that the degree of risk creation necessary for DMM and
SDM is substantially the same.
In invalidating the Colorado equivalent of DMM (extreme indifference
murder) on state equal protection grounds, the Supreme Court of Colorado
was concerned with whether a jury could reasonably distinguish between
the phrases describing the elements required for SDM and "extreme
indifference" murder.6 The court held that the phrases used in both stat-
utes, "grave risk of death" and "practical certainty of death," were
without a sufficient pragamatic difference to permit an intelligent and
uniform application of the law, and that any definition of extreme indif-
ference murder must be sufficiently coherent and distinct so that a person
of average intelligence could reasonably distinguish it from conduct pro-
scribed by other offenses.'
This is exactly the problem for DMM in New Mexico. "Strong prob-
ability of death or great bodily harm" and "great dangerousness to the
lives of others" are not the sorts of phrases that a person of average
intelligence can pragmatically distinguish between in the context of a
4. 102 N.M. 274, 694 P.2d 922 (1985).
5. 103 N.M. 364, 370, 707 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Ct. App. 1985).
6. People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981).
7. Id. at 80-81. The court stated also that "[t]o base a substantial difference in penalty 'upon the
shifting sands of semantics does not constitute substantial justice.'" Id. at 78 (quoting People v.
Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975)).
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criminal adjudication. The differences in statutory language are simply
stylistic variations or semantic equivalents describing in practical effect
the same degree of risk.
The DMM statute does contain additional language following the phrase
"greatly dangerous to the lives of others," stating "indicating a depraved
mind regardless of human life." But this language adds nothing to the
description of the degree of risk creation necessary for the crime. Pro-
fessors Wayne LaFave and Austin Scott characterize language of this sort
as flowery expressions found in old cases which have been incorporated
into modem statutes, but which are not particularly accurate in charac-
terizing the degree of risk.8 Thus, regardless of the differences in language
used to characterize the degree of risk creation in New Mexico's statutes
relating to SDM and DMM, there are no discernable, useful or practical
differences in the degree of risk creation necessary for conviction under
either statutory section.
While the degree of risk creation does not distinguish the crimes of
DMM and SDM, Johnson raises the issue of whether they can be distin-
guished on the basis of the mens rea or mental culpability elements.
Attempting to distinguish the two crimes, the court in Johnson stated that
"[d]epraved mind murder requires subjective knowledge that one's act is
greatly dangerous to the lives of others [while] second degree murder
requires objective knowledge that one's acts create a strong probability
of death or bodily harm. "' This statement was made noting that the New
Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Beach stated that SDM does contain
the element of subjective knowledge.'" The court in Johnson stated
" [n]otwithstanding the language in Beach, we do not believe the supreme
court intended to make the elements of second degree murder and de-
praved mind murder identical.""
Some explanation is necessary in order to understand the reasoning in
Johnson. New Mexico's Uniform Jury Instruction for DMM states "for
you to find the defendant guilty . . .the state must prove . . . 4. The
defendant knew that his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others." 2
The statement in Johnson was made recognizing that the New Mexico
Supreme Court in State v. McCrary '" agreed with the committee com-
8. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 7.4(a), at 200 (1986).
9. 103 N.M. at 370, 707 P.2d at 1180 (emphasis added).
10. State v. Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115 (1985). New Mexico overhauled its murder
statute in 1980. Prior to the 1980 revision, second degree murder was distinguished from first degree
murder by the kind of malice present. Second degree murder was formerly murder without delib-
eration, but with premeditiation or malice. State v. Aragon, 85 N.M. 401, 512 P.2d 974 (Ct. App.
1973).
I1. 103 N.M. at 370.
12. N.M.U.J.1. CRIM. 14-203 (Recomp. 1986).
13. 100 N.M. 671, 675 P.2d 120 (1984).
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mentary to the Uniform Jury Instruction that DMM requires proof of the
subjective knowledge of the defendant, and that the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Beach stated that SDM requires proof of subjective knowledge.
Thus, the court in Johnson, perceiving that the actus reus elements (in-
cluding risk creation) were identical for the two crimes, struggled to keep
the two crimes distinguishable by stating that SDM requires only proof
of objective knowledge of the degree of risk creation.
In the final analysis, the attempt by the Johnson court to distingush
the two crimes fails. 4 First, the plain interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage argues against an objective standard of knowledge in the case of
SDM. The statute states that a person commits SDM if "he knows" that
his acts create a strong probability of death. Language declaring an ob-jective standard by contrast would state the defendant "should have known"
or "reasonably should have known." Second, the New Mexico Supreme
Court unequivocally stated in Beach that SDM under the current statute
contains the element of subjective knowledge. Third, even if the court
in Johnson were correct that SDM requires proof of objective knowledge,
in McCrary the court ruled that sufficient subjective knowledge exists for
DMM if under the circumstances known to a defendant, the defendant
should have realized the very high degree of risk. 5
The language in McCrary in effect creates a standard of proof for
subjective knowledge identical to that for objective knowledge. The McCrary
court reasoned that because an accused will seldom admit that he actually
knew his acts created a very high degree of risk, the jury can decide
whether the defendant had knowledge of the degree of risk by considering
what the defendant should realize to be the degree of risk in light of the
surrounding circumstances of which he had knowledge. 6 Yet, despite the
14. The issue before the court in Johnson was whether the crime of attempted DMM would be
recognized. Because attempt requires intent to commit the crime attempted, and DMM is defined
without reference to intent and is therefore a kind of unintentional killing, the court was faced with
the absurdity that under the crime of attempted DMM a defendant would have to intend to commit
an unintentional killing. The court held that such a crime could not be recognized. Johnson, 103N.M. at 369, 707 P.2d at 1179. The court however, held that cases of intentional killing are not
necessarily excluded from SDM. Id. at 370, 707 P.2d at 1180.
The argument relating to statutory constructuion that the court relied on to achieve this result is
not convincing. It reasoned that because first degree murder has three alternate definitions, one
including intentional murders (deliberate), DMM must be "something different" and therefore must
exclude intentional murder; but because SDM has only one definition it does not exclude intentional
murder although intent is no longer expressly defined as an element of SDM. Id. Thus, the courtheld that whereas DMM excluded intentional murder, SDM included both intentional and uninten-
tional murder. Id. To accomplish this the court essentialy rewrote the SDM statute to include
intentional killings which are not after deliberation. But because the first degree murder statute
mentioned deliberate killings, the "something different" meant by DMM could just as easily have
included intentional murder without deliberation.
15. 100 N.M. at 673.
16. Id.
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court's emphasis on the words "under the circumstances known to de-
fendants" in describing the method of proof of subjective knowledge, a
jury remains free to infer from other evidence, and not just a defendant's
testimony, exactly what circumstances were known to a defendant, from
which they can in turn infer what a defendant subjectively knew about
the degree of risk involved in his acts. Thus, even if the court in Johnson
were correct that SDM requires only objective knowledge while DMM
requires proof of subjective knowledge, the mode of proof of a defendant's
knowledge would be identical for the two crimes. The distinction drawn
by the court in Johnson is thus one of form, and not of substance.
Language from some New Mexico cases, however, suggests that the
two crimes may be distinguished on the basis of other conditions. Recall
that the court in Johnson held that DMM excluded intentional killings
while SDM did not. 7 The supreme court's prior holding in State v. Sena, 8
however, is to the contrary. In Sena, the defendant argued that his intent
to kill someone (in that case someone other than the victim) removed his
act from the class of DMM. Reasoning that regardless of the defendant's
intent, his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others, the court held
that DMM is not limited by intent and that intent to kill is irrelevant since
it does not preclude the elements which support a depraved mind theory.
The court specifically rejected the defendant's contention that an intent
to kill a particular individual would remove his act from the depraved
mind class of murder. The court in Johnson on the other hand stated that
DMM "expressly excludes a specific intent to kill a specific person."' 9
These cases can be read consistently, however, if Sena is considered
not to have addressed intentional killings where the victim is the object
of the intent, and Johnson is limited to just such intentional killings. The
rule may be that the existence of an intent to kill a particular person does
not make DMM inapplicable unless the victim is the object of that intent.
Although not explicitly stated, it appears that this is the New Mexico
rule, but it is difficult to understand what the rationale would be for such
a rule.2 If it is the correct rule, given the concurrence of the other elements
of DMM and SDM, DMM would be a sub-class of SDM with limited
application and not a crime having distinct elements, because as the court
17. See supra note 14.
18. 99 N.M. 272, 657 P.2d 128 (1983). (Regardless of the presence or absence of specific intent
to kill a particular person, the elements of DMM can be met).
19. 103 N.M. at 368, 707 P.2d at 1178.
20. Application of this rule would mean that accuracy of a defendant's aim would determine the
level of punishment for loss of life under the current statutory scheme. If the defendant were a bad
aim and killed an innocent bystander while attempting to shoot someone he intended to kill (without
deliberation), he could be convicted of first degree murder on a depraved mind theory, while a good
aim killing only the person he intended to kill could insure him of a maximum charge of SDM. See
infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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in Johnson stated SDM includes intentional as well as unintentional kill-
ings.
Another limitation exists on the applicability of DMM. In State v.
DeSantos the court overturned a conviction for DMM stating that the
defendant must have performed an act dangerous to more than one person
for a conviction on that theory.2' By contrast, SDM is not limited to
situtations of risk creation affecting only a single person and applies as
well where an act is dangerous to more than one person.22 While the
rationale for the rule limiting DMM to situations where a defendant
performs an act dangerous to more than one person is unclear, this lim-
itation does not distingush that crime from SDM; it only makes clear that
DMM is a sub-class of SDM.
In summary, the elements of the crimes of DMM and SDM are func-
tionally indistinguishable. However, there may be limitations on the ap-
plication of DMM, imposed by New Mexico courts, which makes DMM
in effect a sub-class of SDM. Regardless of these limitations, the fact
remains that in every case where a defendant could be charged with DMM,
he could also be charged with the indistinguishable crime of SDM.
III. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTES IMPOSING DIFFERENT PENALTIES FOR THE
SAME CRIMINAL ACT
A. Federal Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution does not
provide a basis to hold criminal statutes unconstitutional which have
identical elements but impose different penalty schemes. This issue was
addressed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Batchelder.23 In
Batchelder, the defendant appealed his conviction under statutes prohib-
iting a convicted felon from receiving firearms that had traveled in in-
terstate commerce. The defendant argued that because two different statutory
provisions prohibited convicted felons from receiving firearms, each pro-
vision authorizing a different penalty, he could only be sentenced under
the more lenient provision. In addressing the issue of the constitutionality
21. 89 N.M. 458, 553 P.2d 1265 (1976). There was evidence that the defendant killed the victim
with a cement block. Id. at 460, 553 P.2d at 1267. The court reasoned that killing someone with a
cement block is certainly the work of a depraved mind, but that depraved mind murder is limited
to acts in disregard of human life in general as opposed to circumstances where the defendant intends
to kill one particular person. Id. at 461, 553 P.2d at 1268. This position was reaffirmed by the court
in Sena, 99 N.M. at 274, 657 P.2d at 130.
22. See Johnson, 103 N.M. at 370, 707 P.2d at 1180. The court stated that if a defendant fire
bombed a home intending to kill someone inside knowing that his act created the requisite amount
of risk with respect to others in the home, this could constitute sufficient evidence for a conviction
of attempted second degree murder. Id.
23. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
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of two statutes providing different penalties for the same conduct, the
Court held that such a situation has no constitutional infirmities.24
The Court first acknowledged the rule that where an act violates more
than one criminal statute, the prosecution has the discretion to proceed
under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants.25 The Seventh Circuit, however, had expressed concern over
the application of this rule in instances where statutes have identical
standards of proof or identical elements, distinguished from instances
where the statutes vary in some discernible way. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit was concerned specifically that where two statutes
prohibit exactly the same conduct, prosecutorial discretion could produce
unequal justice.26
Justice Marshall, writing the opinion of the Court in Batchelder, stated
that where two statutes prohibit exactly the same conduct, prosecutorial
discretion does not produce unequal justice absent discrimination against
a class of defendants. "The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties
available upon conviction, but this fact standing alone, does not give rise
to a violation of Equal Protection." 27 The Court reasoned that the dis-
cretion a prosecutor exercises when choosing to proceed under one of
two statutes with different elements is not appreciably different from the
discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under
one of two statutes having identical elements. "In the former situation,
once he determines that the proof will support conviction under either
statute, his decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter
context." 
28
Batchelder stands for the proposition that the fact that a prosecutor
may proceed under either of two statutes which proscribe the same crim-
inal conduct and require the same proof for conviction but impose different
penalties does not present a violation of equal protection under the federal
constitution. While Batchelder involved a crime which was a non-capital
felony, the Court gave no indication, and none can be gleaned from the
opinion, that its reasoning would be any different where capital felonies
are involved. 29 Thus, Batchelder forecloses an argument that New Mex-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 123-24.
26. 581 F.2d 626, 632-34 (7th Cir. 1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's con-
viction, but remanded the case for sentencing.
27. 442 U.S. at 124.
28. Id. at 125.
29. This is because the Court's holding was based on the absence of a threshold showing of
discrimination against any class of defendants, and did not concern the differences in degree or kind
of penalties involved. Although the Court alluded to the fact that in Batchelder the prosecutor did
not have the power to predetermine ultimate criminal sanctions but merely permitted the sentencing
judge to impose a longer prison sentence, the Court stated what was more important was that the
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ico's formulation of DMM violates equal protection under the United
States Constitution.
B. State Constitutions as an Independent Source of Protection
The fact that the United States Constitution does not provide a basis
to invalidate New Mexico's formulation of DMM does not prohibit New
Mexico's own constitution from doing so. "State constitutions, too, are
a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." 3°
It is settled that the federal constitution today provides a minimum for
the protection of individual liberties which the states may surpass so long
as there is no resulting conflict with federal law.3 Thus, the federal
constitution creates a foundation or floor which the states can not un-
dermine in the protection of individual rights, but whose constitutions
may provide additional protections above the federal floor. 2 In fact, state
courts have shown an inclination to do just that. "Between 1970 and
1984, state courts . . . have handed down over 250 published opinions
holding that the constitutional minimums set by the United States Supreme
Court were insufficient to satisfy the more stringent requirements of state
constitutional law. ,33 And every state has now utilized the adequate and
independent state grounds concept to extend state protections beyond
those afforded by the federal constitution, frequently citing state consti-
tutions as the basis for doing so but also using statutory and common
law.34 Clearly New Mexico courts are not prohibited from interpreting
the provisions of its constitution to afford protection of individual liberty
beyond what the federal constitution provides. They have done so, for
fact that a prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction does not give
rise to a violation of equal protection. Id. Thus, regardless of the level of scrutiny applicable in a
case involving the death penalty such as would occur with the DMM problem, without a threshold
showing of discrimination, the constitutionality of the statutes in question would not be examined
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
30. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
491 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions].
31. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). ("Our reasoning . . .
does not . . . limit the authority of the State to . . . adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.") See also Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions].
32. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REV. 977, 980 (1985). This floor is the result of the
application to the states of the majority of protections afforded in the Bill of Rights through incor-
poration into the Fourteenth Amendment, and the effect of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2.
33. Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions, supra note 31, at 548.
34. Roberts, The Adequate and Independent State Ground: Some Practical Considerations, 19
LAND & WATER L. REV. 647 (1984).
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example, in specifying requirements for the constitutionality of road-
blocks.35 Therefore, New Mexico courts may also interpret the equal
protection clause of its constitution36 to provide for the protection of
individual rights beyond that which the federal constitution provides. The
appropriate question is under what circumstances a state court should
turn to its constitution for the protection of individual rights.
Much has been written about the retrenchment of the Supreme Court
in decisions involving individual rights since the Warren Court's expan-
sion of those rights through the incorporation of most of the protections
of the federal Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, making
those protections applicable to the states.37 The main criticism of state
courts' response to this retrenchment-allowing greater protection of in-
dividual rights under state constitutions-is that it is too frequently result
oriented and opportunistic. It is plain that the objective of achieving
different results is not a good reason or even a desirable one for resort
to state constitutions. This is because an instrumentalist and opportunistic
approach to state constitutions does not help develop jurisprudence adapt-
able to state law, but rather uses state constitutions piecemeal for purposes
of philosophical disagreement.39 Thus, commentators have recognized
that a principled and sound doctrinal basis is necessary for the devel-
opment of state constitutional jurisprudence. 4 Ultimately, what is desir-
able is a body of law giving meaning to state constitutional provisions
so that their significance as well as their role in developing state law is
fully understood and realized. The development of such law should also
identify the reasons and the circumstances upon which state constitutions
should be relied.
The principle advanced by many commentators is that reliance on state
35. See Hollander & Nelson, In Search of a Reasonable Suspicion on the Road to California:
Stops, Searches and Seizures and the "Drug Courier Profile", I I CHAMPION 7 (1987), suggesting
comparison of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1987) and United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1975).
36. N.M. CONST. art. i, § 18.
37. "For several years now there has been an unmistakable trend in the Court to read the guarantees
of individual liberty restrictively, which means that the content of the rights applied to the states is
likewise diminished." Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions, supra note 31, at 547. See also
citations in: Comment, The Primacy Method of State Constitutional Decisionmaking: Interpreting
the Maine Constitution, 38 MAINE L. REV. 491 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, The Primacy Method];
Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 396
n. 70 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First Things First].
38. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HAST. C.
L. Q. 1, 2-3 (1981) [hereinafter Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions]; Clay, Human Freedom
and State Constitutional Law; Part One, The Renaissance, 70 MASS. L. REV. 161, 168 (Dec. 1985)
[hereinafter Clay, Human Freedom]; Comment, The Primacy Method, supra note 37, at 493.
39. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, supra note 38, at 13.
40. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, supra note 38, at 3; Clay, Human Freedom, supra
note 38, at 168.
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constitutions is mandated by the very nature of our federalist system of
government. Federalism requires state courts to examine any state con-
stitutional issue first, with the court proceeding to the federal constitution
only if claims fail under the state constitution. This principle has been
termed by some commentators the "primacy method."'" It is based on
the Madisonian vision of two separate sovereigns each providing protec-
tion to individuals in their respective spheres of power and authority.42
The Madisonian vision was one of double security to the people by
dividing the power surrendered by the people into two distinct govern-
ments, with the judiciary of each having a vital role in providing the
contemplated protection from the abuses of governmental power.43 Thus,
the foci of federal and state governments in guaranteeing rights must
diverge, and variation in the form that protection takes results from the
institutional differences between the state and federal judiciary." The
strength of the system, however, remains in that it provides a double
source of protection for the rights of our citizens.45
The institutional differences distinguishing the interaction between the
federal constitution and the federal judiciary on the one hand, and the
interaction between the state constitutions and state judiciary bodies on
the other have been discussed in some detail.' These differences have
been described as falling into three groups: "first, differences betweeen
the national and fundamental role assumed by federal constitutional law
... and the supplementary functions left to state constitutional law;
second, differences in the political roles of federal and state judges; and
third, differences in the political responsiveness of federal and state con-
stitutions themselves." 47 The cumulative impact of these differences is
that state constitutions and judiciary bodies are more responsive to po-
41. Comment, The Primacy Method, supra note 37, at 495-6, recognizing the genesis of this
terminology in Linde, Without Due Process: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125,
131-35 (1970).
42. Comment, The Primacy Method, supra note 37, at 503.
43. See Clay, Human Freedom, supra note 38, at 164; Comment,The Primacy Method, supra
note 37, at 499 (both citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
("In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between
two distinct governments, and then the portion alloted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.")
44. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1324 (1982) [hereinafter Developments].
45. Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions, supra note 31, at 552.
46. Developments, supra note 44.
47. Id. at 1347. Detailing the analysis, the note reasons that state judges are more politically
accountable than federal judges by and large; state courts are lawmakers in other areas (common
law) so their active role in constitutional law is easier to justify; state constitutions are more susceptible
to revision in response to popular opinion and have characteristically a greater content than the
federal constitution. Consequently, state constitutions are in total more integrated into the democratic
process of state government. Id. at 1347-56.
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litical pressures and are more integrated into the policymaking process
at the state level, with the consequence that the concerns which argue
for restraint in the federal context (particularly the antidemocratic and
countermajoritarian character of judicial activism) are significantly re-
duced at the state level.48 Because state courts have more freedom to
focus on the content of constitutional rights than on an interpretation of
those rights strongly tempered by a concern for judicial restraint, what
some commentators have identified as the pattern of underenforcement
of federal constitutional guarantees by the Supreme Court may be alle-
viated at the state level.49 State courts, however, are also, therefore, a
less effective check on majoritarian impulses. These differences in total
illustrate a distinct function for state constitutional law, where states can
approach constitutional interpretations more innovatively and experimen-
tally, achieving a result more closely attuned to local circumstances and
concerns. 50
The concept that states serve as constitutional laboratories where ex-
perimentation and innovation take place is a particularly important func-
tional distinction between federal and state judiciary bodies. "The importance
of leaving ample leeway for state experimentation has been a standard
argument for restraint in the elaboration of federal constitutional limits."'"
In the Warren era, justices dissenting to the incorporation of protections
found in the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment extolled the
virtues of allowing states to serve as laboratories recognizing diversity.52
For example, Justice Brandeis is often quoted for his statement in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as 'a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." 53 Similarly Justice Harlan opined
in Williams v. Florida that one of the basic virtues of our federal system
is that it leaves ample room for governmental and social experimentation
in a diverse society.54 And Justice Powell delivering the opinion for the
Court in Gerstein v. Pugh stated "[wihile we limit our holding to the
48. Id.
49. Id. The note suggests that the institutional role and pressures on the Supreme Court weigh
toward a lack of full enforcement of the rights embodied in the federal constitution. See also Williams,
Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985) & n. 178 [hereinafter
Williams, Equality Guarantees].
50. Developments, supra note 44, at 1348-50.
51. Id. at 1349.
52. Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions, supra note 3 1, at 549 (citing Abrahamson, Criminal
Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141,
1141 n.2 (1985)).
53. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
54. 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring in the result).
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precise requirements of the [federal constitution], we recognize the de-
sirabilty of flexibility and experimentation by the states."
55
One commentator has observed that the Supreme Court is often a
follower rather than a leader in the development of constitutional doctrine
with the Court acting "only after a good number of [states] have tested
out a theory and endorsed its results."5 6 Because it is important that the
process of experimentation continue so that future courts may benefit
from the multiplicity of doctrinal perspectives, independent interpretation
of state constitutional provisions is both valuable and necessary. Further,
federal doctrine will itself be more responsive and productive when molded
by debate than when produced in a judicial vacuum with little or no
competing analysis. 7 Although the selective application of the federal
Bill of Rights to the states in effect means that experimentation in the
state laboratories which endangers nationally recognized rights and lib-
erties cannot be permitted, experimentation in the space above the fed-
erally mandated floor may still flourish.58
Summarizing, in recognition of the distinct functional role of state
judiciary bodies, encompassing their ability to respond to the unique
circumstances present at the state level, their greater integration into the
policy making process, and their attendant ability to focus more on the
content of constitutional rights, and in order for states to fulfill their role
as laboratories for the development of constitutional doctrine, states should
as a matter of course look first to their own constitutional provisions
before examining a federal constitutional question in resolution of a case.
Commentators advocating reliance on state constitutions have urged
that not only does federalism require the development of a body of state
constitutional law by state courts, but that other reasons counsel state
courts to turn to state constitutional law as a matter of course before
addressing a potential federal constitutional question.59 For example, Jus-
tice Hans Linde advocates that state courts always address the state con-
stitution first because state bills of rights are "first in time and first in
logic." '  He reasons that by 1783, thirteen states had adopted written
constitutions, most containing a catologue of civil liberties that were by
no means identical. This diversity was not accidental because political
55. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975).
56. Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1127
(1982).
57. See Comment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and Assessment of Current Meth-
odology, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 593, 611-15 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Current Methodology].
58. Brennan, Revival of State Constitutions, supra note 31, at 550.
59. Clay, Human Freedom, supra note 38; Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions, supra note
38; Linde, First Things First, supra note 37.
60. Linde, First Things First, supra note 37, at 380.
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leaders before the Continental Congress rejected the idea of uniform
constitutions for the states in favor of calling upon states to write con-
stitutions satisfactory to themselves. 6 ' Instead of being the model for the
states, the federal Bill of Rights was added to the United States Consti-
tution to meet demands for the same protections against the central gov-
ernment that the people had secured against their own state governments.62
Even states that adopted new constitutions during the decades following
adoption of the federal Bill of Rights "took their bills of rights from pre-
existing state constitutions rather than from the federal amendments." 63
Further, Linde points out that throughout the nineteenth century and the
first quarter of the twentieth, state courts decided questions of constitu-
tional rights under their own constitutions without awaiting interpretations
by the United States Supreme Court, because throughout that time it was
only a hypothesis that states were bound by the majority of the provisions
of the federal constitution. Thus, he concludes historically the commit-
ment by states to individual rights came first.'
Linde also suggests state constitutions are first in the logic of consti-
tutional law.65 He states that the principle that a court will not needlessly
decide a case on constitutional grounds when other grounds are available
applies equally to the effect that a court should not decide a case on
federal constitutional grounds when state constitutional law will ade-
quately dispose of the case. 6 The logic underlying this principle is in
part the conservation of judicial resources, but there is more to it than
that.
Another commentator states that the justification for such a practice
can be found in the logic of interpreting and applying the law as practiced
by judiciary bodies.67 Ronald Collins observes that when state law is
disregarded and a federal court is thereby denied the opportunity to review
a case on the basis of state law, either statutory or constitutional, the
resulting opinion leaves the impression that state law is either incom-
patible with the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, or that the
scope of state law is yet to be resolved notwithstanding a resolution of
the case based on the United States Constitution. Collins points out that
61. Id. at 381.
62. id.
63. Id. New Mexico's constitution, which was not adopted until 1911, contains provisions which
by and large resemble those of other state constitutions (Idaho, Montana, Utah and Wyoming) more
closely than they resemble the language of the United States Constitution.
64. Id. at 382.
65. Id. at 383-84.
66. Id. at 383. Former Chief Justice Burger as well as Justices Brennan and Marshall have invited
state courts to do just that. Id. at 383-84.
67. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITrIONAL LAW (B. McGraw ed. 1985) [hereinafter Collins, Some Random Thoughts].
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this approach stands the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment on its head
because the dictate of that amendment depends on what the state has
actually done. Thus, without a final resolution based on state law, a
decision whether the state action comports with the United States Con-
stitution is premature and inappropriate.' Where a court in fact rules in
such a case that the federal constitution prohibits certain actions by the
state, this does not mean that the state constitution permits such actions,
only that the state question remains open.
Therefore, if courts take seriously their duty to create certainty in the
realm of state law, they must decide a question under state law despite
their decision under federal law. Considering a state law question first
both proceeds according to the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment and
helps to bring certainty to state law, alleviating the confusion engendered
when a case is decided on federal grounds alone. In addition, where the
state law decision itself is sufficient, this approach helps to assure finality
of judgment (except where the judgment contravenes federal law), pro-
moting judicial economy by reducing protracted litigation occasioned by
subsequent review at the federal level.
Proponents of federal dominance argue that state courts cannot ignore
the enormous jurisprudential weight of federal decisions and the concom-
itant respect commanded thereby, and that federal dominance will enhance
uniformity and predictability.69 However, reliance on federal opinions as
if they were the only ones available appears to be a creature unique to
constitutional law in the post-incorporationist period.7 ° One commentator
argues that abstention from reliance on state constitutions because state
courts are accustomed to deference to the Supreme Court is essentially
abstention for no other reason than inertia. 7' Abstention for the reason of
inertia is as lacking in principle as reliance on state constitutions solely
to achieve different results.
Another commentator suggests that reliance on precedents from non-
forum states ("horizontal influence") should be as healthy when looking
for decisional guidance in the area of constitutional law as it is in the
areas of contract, property and substantive criminal law.72 The problem
at present is the scarcity of legal resources to accomplish such interstate
judicial communication.73 But the lack of such jurisprudential resources
68. Id. See also Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L.
REV. 125 (1970).
69. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DEN.
U. L. REV. 85 (1985).
70. Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 67, at 16.
71. Greenhalgh, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long and the Short of It, DE-
VELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211 (B. McGraw ed. 1985).
72. Collins, Some Random Thoughts, supra note 67, at 16-17.
73. Id.
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is not an adequate or acceptable reason for backing away from the re-
sponsibility to create such resources. Reliance on federal precedent be-
cause of the scarcity of precedent from other states cannot be used as a
justification for judicial laxity in developing state constitutional doctrine,
and if continually practiced will, like inertia, be self-perpetuating.
Answering the asserted need for uniformity and predictability, it is
additionally clear that federal law itself has not remained stable or pre-
dictable (e.g. the law on search and seizure) and it is just as clear that a
uniform standard does not assure uniform results (e.g. federal equal pro-
tection law). As one commentator suggests, the question must be asked
whether uniformity is even appropriate in a particular area.74 In addition
to the fact that unique state interests and histories make uniformity in-
appropriate,75 as the prior discussion indicates, the federal system itself
means that individual rights may differ from state to state.
The uniformity argument moreover becomes a two-edged sword in the
equal protection area. Because the purpose of equal protection is to ac-
complish uniform treatment of similarly situated individuals, uniform
adherence to a judicial standard which allows some non-uniform treatment
to remain uncorrected, calls to bear a critique of form over substance.76
Thus, one must ask at what level uniformity is desired. In light of the
distinct functional roles of federal and state judiciary bodies, the call for
uniformity by reliance on federal constitutional law at the state level is
nothing more than a call to keep up appearances at the expense of the
proper functioning of our federalist system. It is a call to cease experi-
mentation and to cripple growth of the law.
In summary, if state courts are to fulfill their unique functions in our
federalist system, they must take seriously their position as an additional
tier of protection for individual rights, and acknowledge their need to be
more responsive to political pressures and more integrated into the state
policymaking process than their federal counterparts. The alternative of
submitting state law to the dominance of federal law ignores the unique
legal, social and political culture and history of any given state, and
denies state courts the ability to use their expertise in dealing with state
and local issues.77 State courts should also embrace their role as labora-
tories, developing a healthy diversity in constitutional doctrine to assist
other courts, both state and federal, in the development and evolution of
74. Clay, Human Freedom, supra note 38, at 164.
75. Greenhalgh, supra note 71, at 221.
76. The problem of disparate punishment schemes for depraved mind murder and second degree
murder under New Mexico law, as discussed in this Comment, is a good example. If adherence to
a federal standard allows radically disparate treatment of criminals convicted of committing the same
criminal act, uniform adherence to that standard will perpetuate non-uniform results.
77. Comment, The Primacy Method, supra note 37, at 509.
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constitutional law. The best way in which state courts can fulfill their
functional role is by deciding cases on state grounds first.
C. Interpreting State Constitutions
Once a state court has recognized the importance of interpreting its
own constitution, the question becomes how to interpret its provisions.
One commentator has identified the fundamental question as whether a
state should interpret its constitutional provisions differently from their
federal counterparts.78 Framing the question in this way fails to perceive
the significance of the reasons for interpreting state constitutions in the
first place. It is because of the dictates of federalism, discussed in the
previous section, that state courts should interpret their own constitutions,
and therefore ask how to interpret their state constitutional provisions
rather than whether to interpret them differently from their federal coun-
terparts. If state courts perceive a need to justify an interpretation different
from federal constitutional doctrine, they need not look beyond the rea-
sons for interpreting their own constitutions at all.
As an empirical matter, however, state courts have identified the fol-
lowing circumstances or factors as justifying a departure from federal
constitutional doctrine: (1) textual and structural differences between the
federal and state constitutional provisions; (2) pre-existing state common
law; (3) matters of local concern with needs very different from those of
a federal system, state traditions and public attitudes; and (4) vague or
confusing federal guidelines.79 Some of these factors, such as unique
matters of local concern or state traditions and public attitudes, involve
fundamental federalist values. Others, such as textual differences, are
reasons independent of federalist values which support a departure from
federal doctrine. In the final analysis, a state court pondering how to
interpret its constitution should consider all the relevant factors-those
involving federalist values and those that do not-while understanding
that its purpose in interpreting its constitution is based on the values of
federalism.
At this general level, state constitutional interpretation is particularly
appropriate in New Mexico in part because of its unique multi-cultural
composition (Hispanic, American Indian, and Caucasian). This multi-
78. Comment, Current Methodology, supra note 57. It is suggested that there are two theories
pursued by courts in determining whether to interpret state constitutional provisions differently than
their federal counterparts: "'factor' analysis" and "independent analysis." Id. at 604-605. Factor
analysis looks to the presence of certain factors to justify a departure from federal constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 604. The independent analysis approach states simply that through adherence
to fundamental federalist values, states should interpret state constitutions for themselves with'no
need to support a departure from federal guidelines. Id. at 605.
79. Id. at 605-11.
Spring 1989]
528 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
ethnicity devolves upon state government a concern and responsibility to
balance the traditions and values of those cultures and to adapt to the
unique legal problems that have arisen from the mixing of those cultures.
New Mexico is also unusual in its heavy economic dependence upon the
mining industry, its large proportion of unurbanized areas, and its need
to deal with legal problems arising from the legacy of Spanish rule. In
total, New Mexico has a wealth of matters of local concern which involve
local attitudes, problems and traditions, with resultant needs very different
from and perhaps easily overlooked by a huge federal system. Therefore,
the federalism concerns and values supporting independent interpretation
of state constitutions are vividly represented in New Mexico.
D. Equal Protection and State Constitutions
Most state constitutions do not contain an equal protection clause,
although many states have added such clauses to their constitutions in
recent years.8" Even state constitutions that do not contain an equal pro-
tection clause do, however, contain provisions reflecting concerns about
equality. For example, the Virginia Bill of Rights, which was adopted
before the Declaration of Independence, contains a provision stating:
"That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights . . . namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty." 8
State courts have made equal protection-like rulings in the absence of an
equal protection clause, using other state constitutional or statutory pro-
visions reflecting equality concerns.82
Until recently, state courts had developed little doctrine independent
of federal equal protection doctrine under state equal protection clauses
or under general equality provisions contained in state constitutions.83
State courts have been less active in the area of equal protection compared
to other areas such as search and seizure, perhaps in part because federal
results were thought satisfactory until relatively recently. One commen-
tator has criticized the failure of state courts to develop independent
doctrine, stating it has resulted in the withdrawal of legal authority from
state judges to make independent judgment on the contours of equal
protection, making any reference to state equal protection law functionally
80. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 71 (B. McGraw ed. 1985), [hereinafter Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law]. New
Mexico, however, has had an equal protection clause in its constitution since its inception, viz. "nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
8 1. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, supra note 80, at 74-5.
82. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 590 n.ll, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n. 1l, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 609 n. II (1971), appeal after remand, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 748, 557 P.2d 929, 949, 135
Cal. Rptr. 345, 365 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977), supplemented, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569
P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
83. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, supra note 80, at 76.
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meaningless, making state supreme courts the functional equivalent of
federal appellate courts, and meaning that there is neither state law nor
a state court that can accurately be labeled supreme.' In fact, most state
courts have not yet recognized the full significance of the different origins,
foci, functions and even the different text of the equal protection clause
or equality provisions in their state constitutions.
Significantly, the number of states rejecting the United States Supreme
Court's judicial doctrine developed in interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is growing.85 Many states have
rediscovered their state equality provisions "decid[ing] for themselves
whether governmental actions violate the equality policies embodied in
their constitutions."86
State courts conducting independent analysis of state equal protection
claims have used one of two methodologies; either the state adopts the
federal framework of analysis but applies those constructs independently,
or the courts reject the federal constructs and apply their own analytical
framework.87 States utilizing the federal form of judicial analysis for equal
protection follow the Supreme Court's suspect class/fundamental right
level of scrutiny approach, but often reach results different from those
of the United States Supreme Court. 8 For example, California has held
sex to be a suspect class, 9 and that its equality provisions can be triggered
without state action." Other states apply the rational basis test more
rigorously than does the United States Supreme Court.9' And some states
which have not yet developed independent doctrine suggest that state
courts will do so. For example, the Montana Supreme Court has stated
that its state equal protection guarantee (textually similar to its federal
counterpart) is enforceable in its own sphere and should be interpreted
by standards consistent with that objective.92 Similar language in the
seminal California case of Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,93 pre-
saged the development of state equal protection doctrine in California.
Thus, there is a trend for states to recognize both their duty to give
84. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095,
1115-16 (1985).
85. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, supra note 80, at 76.
86. Williams, Equality Guarantees, supra note 49, at 1219.
87. Id.
88. Williams, Equality and State Constitutional Law, supra note 80, at 81.
89. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 11-13, 485 P.2d 529, 539-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339-
41 (1971). See also State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627 (N.D. 1977), Hanson
v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 199, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973).
90. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 29 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1979).
91. See, e.g., McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975). See also Williams,
Equality and State Constitutional Law, supra note 80, at 81 nn. 102 & 107.
92. Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978).
93. 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
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independent meaning to the equality provisions in their constitutions, and
to understand that those provisions emanate from cultural, political, his-
torical and legal contexts different from those which gave rise to the Equal
Protection Clause in the United States Constitution.
E. Equal Protection Under The New Mexico Constitution
New Mexico has been a participant rather than a bystander in this
trend. The equal protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution pro-
vides ". . . nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. "94
In Chapman v. Luna, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated "[a]lthough
the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and New
Mexico Constitution have been interpreted similarly . . .they neverthe-
less constitute independent rights and protections." 95 In its reasoning the
court cited with approval Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,9 6 which
stands for the proposition that state law retains its independent force
despite its textual resemblance to federal law. 97 Chapman v. Luna thus
signifies two things. First, despite the textual similarities between the
Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution and the United
States Constitution, the former provides rights and protections indepen-
dent of the latter. Second, the New Mexico judiciary has the legal authority
under New Mexico's equal protection clause to make judgments inde-
pendent of federal decisions, and to develop its own state equal protection
doctrine. This is tantamount to a recognition that New Mexico courts
should examine the unique cultural, political and historical circumstances
of the state as well as the unique functions of state courts when developing
doctrine to address equal protection problems under the New Mexico
constitution.
Chapman stands as the first clear statement by the New Mexico Su-
preme Court recognizing the independent force and vitality of the equal
protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution, in what otherwise has
been a confusing line of cases by the New Mexico judiciary. In earlier
cases examining whether statutes violate the equal protection clause of
the New Mexico Constitution, the New Mexico Court of Appeals had
stated in Garcia v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Educ., "[t]he
standards for violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States
and New Mexican Constitutions are the same,"9" and in Sena School Bus
94. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 18.
95. 102 N.M. 768, 769, 701 P.2d 367, 368 (1985). The court held that a statutory provision
invalidated in its earlier opinion in the same case had been invalidated solely on New Mexico
constitutional grounds.
96. 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
97. Chapman, 102 N.M. at 769-70, 701 P.2d at 368-69.
98. 95 N.M. 391, 393, 622 P.2d 699, 701 (Ct. App. 1980).
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Co. v. Board of Educ. of the Santa Fe Public Schools, it had stated that
"[tihe tests to determine the validity of a statute challenged under the
United States and New Mexico equal protection clauses are the same.""
The language of these cases appears to suggest that New Mexico courts
have embraced federal equal protection doctrine in interpreting the equal
protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution. However, other New
Mexico cases clearly diverge from federal equal protection doctrine both
in result and in the substantive standards applied."o Prior to Chapman,
the most the New Mexico Supreme Court had to say on the subject was
in Board of Trustees of the Town of Las Vegas v. Montano, where it stated
"[tihere is a close correspondence in meaning and purpose between the
principles underlying the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . .and [the] Con-
stitution of New Mexico."" 0 ' Chapman thus clarifies the confusion re-
sulting from earlier cases and makes plain that the cases suggesting the
independent force and vitality of the equal protection clause of the New
Mexico Constitution were correct in that regard.
Chapman v. Luna stated that New Mexico's equal protection clause
constituted an independent right and protection, distinct from its federal
counterpart.'02 For this to be true its reach can only be greater than that
of the federal Equal Protection Clause, because as has been seen the
United States Constitution provides a floor below which the states cannot
fall. Therefore, the standards for its enforcement cannot be identical to
those under federal equal protection doctrine, or New Mexico courts
would be incapable of making independent judgments on the rights and
protections afforded by New Mexico's equal protection clause. Chapman
thus implies that the language in Garcia and Sena School Bus Co. must
mean that New Mexico has borrowed the judicial constructs it uses in
equal protection analysis under its constitution from federal case law, but
is not bound by the analysis and results of those cases.
An examination of New Mexico case law demonstrates that this is
exactly what New Mexico courts have done. In McGeehan v. Bunch, the
court relied on and utilized the then current federal explication of the
99. 101 N.M. 26, 29, 677 P.2d 639, 642 (Ct. App. 1984).
100. See. e.g., State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966) (There is a violation of equal
protection where law enforcement authorities can subject one person to the possibility of greater
punishment than another who has committed the identical criminal act, even absent evidence of any
discrimination); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975) (The court used the federal
explication of the rational basis test to hold that New Mexico's guest statute violated equal protection,
but applied it with much greater rigor than would be expected if the court had followed the application
of the test by the Supreme Court).
101. 82 N.M. 340, 343, 481 P.2d 702, 705 (1971).
102. 102 N.M. 768, 701 P.2d 367 (1985).
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rational basis test.'03 The formulation of the rational basis test used by
the court was that the classification made by the statute "'must be rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.""'°
Applying this test, the court held New Mexico's guest statute unconsti-
tutional. '05 The court reasoned that although the state's interest was per-
missible, the classification created by the statute failed because it "penalized"
too severely the class of persons discriminated against. "o The court also
attacked the purposes of the statute as being outdated and thus of lesser
importance than when the statute was originally enacted.,o7 This level of
analysis can hardly be considered typical of federal equal protection cases
using the rational basis test. '
Therefore, just as plainly as New Mexico courts use federal judicial
constructs in performing equal protection analysis-borrowing the form
of analysis and terminology used by federal courts-the substantive results
obtained by New Mexico's more rigorous application of the rational basis
test achieves different results than would be expected were those same
tests applied by federal courts. Further distinguishing New Mexico's equal
protection doctrine from that followed at the federal level is a greater
emphasis on arbitrariness in the application of laws."
The reasons for this more rigorous approach to equal protection in New
Mexico can be seen as a natural outgrowth of its history involving equality
issues. For example, New Mexico's first constitution, written in 1850,
created quite an uproar. It took a firm stand against slavery at a time
when Congress was debating the proposed Compromise of 1850, which
involved the question of including slavery in newly admitted territories. 0
That first constitution never went into effect because New Mexico was
not yet organized as a territory of the United States but was under direction
of a military governor. "' When New Mexico finally adopted a constitution
103. 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975). The case involved the hospitality statute which prevented
a gratuitous passenger in a vehicle from suing the host for an act of negligence.
104. Id. at 310, 540 P.2d at 240 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
105. Id. at 314, 540 P.2d at 244.
106. Id. at 311, 540 P.2d at 241.
107. Id. at 312, 540 P.2d at 242.
108. Compare McGeehan v. Bunch with Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483
(1955) and Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456(1981), in which the Court accepted
what the legislature or state said was the purpose of a statute and upheld the statute as long as it
was conceivable that some relationship existed between the stated purpose and the statute.
109. See State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966) where the court was concerned that
the potential for arbitrary application of criminal laws at the discretion of the prosecutor would
violate equal protection, see supra note 97, and Michael J. Maloof & Co. v. Bureau of Revenue,
80 N.M. 485, 458 P.2d 89 (1969), where the court was concerned with whether imposition of tax
on liquor wholesalers and not wholesalers of other commodities resulted in arbitrary taxation.
110. J. RrnENHOUSE, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 1850 (1965).
Ill. Id.
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in 1911, it contained strong provisions concerning the equality of Spanish
speaking citizens, and gave political rights to women which were not
recognized at the federal level or in most other states. Specifically, con-
cerning the equality of Spanish speaking citizens, the New Mexico Con-
stitution gave the right to vote to all citizens regardless of religion, race,
language or color and provided that children of Spanish descent would
never be denied the right of admission to public schools nor ever classed
in separate schools." 2 In addition, the New Mexico Constitution as adopted
in 1911 granted women the right to vote in school elections (a provision
contrary to the then-current political rights afforded women in the United
States)." 3 New Mexico is also in the minority in another area of gender
equality in that it is one of nine community property states. Community
property law recognizes equal property rights in marital property acqui-
sitions and has been called "merely a shorthand rendition of the whole
concept that the husband and wife are equals."" 4 In view of this legacy
on equality issues, it should come as no surprise that New Mexico's equal
protection doctrine has more teeth than its federal counterpart.
One unresolved question is whether New Mexico's equal protection
analytic constructs are updated automatically as federal constructs are
modified, as Garcia and Sena School Bus Co. suggest they might be.
New Mexico embraced a two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis
in McGeehan v. Bunch, invoking strict scrutiny where legislation involves
suspect classifications or touches fundamental interests, and using rational
basis review in other instances. "' However, since the decision in Mc-
Geehan v. Bunch, the Supreme Court has handed down a number of cases
suggesting a middle-tier of scrutiny exists under federal equal protection
analysis." 6 No New Mexico case law has explicitly adopted this middle-
tier approach,' "' in part because middle-tier review was developed for
gender based discrimination, and the fact that New Mexico has added an
Equal Rights Amendment" 8 to its constitution would in theory subject
gender discrimination to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
of the New Mexico Constitution. However, the court's analysis in McGeehan
112. N.M. CONST. art. ViI, §3 and art. XII, § 10.
113. R. W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 1846-1912 (1968).
114. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L.
REV. 20, 27 (1967).
115. 88 N.M. 308, 310, 540 P.2d 238, 240 (1975).
116. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (rational basis plus or rational basis with a bite).
117. Since this Comment was written, the New Mexico Supreme Court, acknowledging confusion
in prior case law over what standard of review was being applied, explicitly adopted an intermediate
equal protection standard of review in striking down the statutory limitation on damages for dramshop
liability. Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).
118. Effective in 1973, New Mexico added to its constitution the text "[e]quality of rights under
law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
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v. Bunch appears more closely attuned to federal middle-tier than to
traditional rational basis review under the federal doctrine. It may be,
therefore, that in effect New Mexico has always used a sort of middle-
tier analysis for what it calls rational basis review.
In sum, although New Mexico's equal protection doctrine is far from
being fully developed, its courts have not relied upon and uncritically
embraced federal equal protection doctrine in resolving equality problems.
New Mexico's equal protection doctrine affords protection exceeding that
of the floor established by federal equal protection doctrine applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause,
in that it applies the rational basis test more vigorously and is more keenly
concerned with arbitrariness in the application of its laws. These differ-
ences are both explainable and supported by New Mexico's heritage of
concern for equality.
IV. DEPRAVED MIND MURDER AND NEW MEXICO'S EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Because New Mexico's equal protection doctrine differs from federal
equal protection doctrine in its focus on arbitrariness, different results are
reached under the New Mexico Constitution in the situation where statutes
provide different penalties for the identical criminal act. This is exactly
the problem with DMM where, because of the identical elements of DMM
and SDM, the state is allowed to arbitrarily determine under which statute
it will prosecute. Recall that in Batchelder, the Court in this kind of
situation found no discrimination as a threshold question, without which
it held there could be no equal protection violation." 9 Thus, the Court
in Batchelder never reached the question of the appropriate level of
scrutiny for the statute in question because it found there was no disparate
treatment of individuals belonging to identifiable groups. 20 New Mexico
courts, however, have found a violation of equal protection under its
constitution where the potential for arbitrary enforcement of a criminal
statute exists. 121
In State v. Chavez, a case decided thirteen years before Batchelder,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held "[w]e no longer subscribe to that
view which would permit law enforcement authorities to subject one
person to the possibility of a greater punishment than another who has
committed an identical act. This would do violence to the equal protection
clauses of our state and federal constitutions. "122
119. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979).
120. Id. at 124-25.
121. State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966).
122. Id. at 82, 419 P.2d at 459.
[Vol. 19
AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Explaining this holding, the court in State v. Sharpe said the "court
was condemning the situation wherein the state could choose between
alternative statutes providing different punishments for the same criminal
act."' 2 3 Because Chavez and Sharpe are still good law insofar as they
pertain to the protection of individual rights under the New Mexico Con-
stitution, and because they provide for the invalidation of statutes on
equal protection grounds where such statutes prescribe different penalties
for the identical criminal act, the scope of rights protected by the equal
protection clause under the New Mexico Constitution is greater than that
afforded under the federal constitution. What remains unclear after Chavez
and Sharpe is what analysis and reasoning compels this conclusion.
Chavez and Sharpe indicate that the threshold level for conducting
equal protection analysis of criminal statutes under the New Mexico
Constitution (whether there is discrimination) is met if a statutory scheme
makes certain that there will be arbitrary enforcement. Thus, in contrast
to the United States Constitution (as explained in Batchelder ), equal
protection under the New Mexico Constitution may be violated where
arbitrary enforcement is inevitable under a statutory scheme, although
the scheme is not facially discriminatory or has not been demonstrated
to be discriminatory in its application.
The difficulty for New Mexico courts is that invoking this prior case
law alone is insufficient to achieve the goals of developing meaningful
state constitutional doctrine: fulfilling the unique functions of state ju-
diciary in our federalist system or aiding in the development of consti-
tutional doctrine. Following these prior cases without an explanation of
the underlying reasoning would make a court susceptible to the criticism
that the state constitution is being invoked for the purposes of achieving
a different result and not on any principled doctrinal basis. A more sat-
isfactory approach would include a concerted effort to explain the un-
derpinnings of the rule of Chavez and Sharpe, explicating the principled
analysis upon which state equal protection doctrine rests. While it is not
difficult to understand the reasoning that may underly the rule in Chavez
and Sharpe, it involves an analysis that diverges from that of Batchelder.
That diverging analysis can be explained as follows.
In Batchelder the Court stated "when an act violates more than one
criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as
it does not discriminate against any class of defendants."' 2 4 The Court
also said that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforce-
ment 'based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other
123. 81 N.M. 637, 639, 471 P.2d 671, 673 (Ct. App. 1970).
124. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123-24.
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arbitrary classification." 25 The Court then held that the fact that a pros-
ecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction stand-
ing alone, does not give rise to a violation of equal protection.' 6 In so
holding the Court reasoned that once a prosecutor determines that the
available proof will support conviction under either of two statutes, there
is no difference in the discretion he uses in deciding whether to charge
under one of two statutes having identical elements and choosing to
proceed under one of two statutes with different elements. '27 This analysis,
however, is not completely satisfying.
Chavez and Sharpe suggest an analysis which concludes that where a
prosecutor's decision to proceed under one of two statutes having identical
elements can be based only on the degree of punishment available, such
a decision constitutes enforcement based upon an unjustifiable standard
(the lack of any standard other than the degree of punishment available)
and the result is arbitrary discrimination to the detriment of defendants
charged under the statute carrying the greater penalty. This analysis rec-
ognizes a difference in the bases for the prosecutor's decision in the two
circumstances described by the Court in Batchelder. Where a prosecutor
makes a decision to proceed under one of two statutes having different
elements but where he determines that the proof will support conviction
under either, the decision may be based on a greater likelihood of con-
viction under one statute. However, where a prosecutor makes a decision
to proceed under one of two statutes having identical elements, it is not
a decision based in any way on the likelihood of conviction because the
proof in every case is equally sufficient to convict under either statute; it
is a decision in which the only possible basis is the degree of punishment
available. Thus the difference is that in the former situation a prosecutor's
decision may rest on the likelihood of securing a conviction as well as a
consideration of the level of punishment available, but in the latter sit-
uation the prosecutor's decision can only be based on the level of pun-
ishment available, thereby allowing the level of punishment to be determined
at the discretion of the prosecutor. Following this analysis, the Court in
Batchelder can be said to have mischaracterized the second situation as
one in which a prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available,
when in fact it is a situation where the prosecutor's decision can only be
made on the basis of such penalties.
This interpretation of the rule in Chavez and Sharpe thus provides the
analysis under which a court may hold that DMM violates the equal
protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution. DMM is a capital
125. Id. at 125 n.9.
126. Id. at 125.
127. id.
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felony punishable by life imprisonment or death,128 whereas SDM as a
second degree felony is punishable by a maximum sentence of twelve
years.'29 Because DMM not only provides for a much greater term of
imprisonment than SDM but also allows for the imposition of the death
penalty, a person charged with DMM risks a much greater punishment
than a person who has committed an identically defined criminal act but
is charged with SDM. This statutory scheme allows the state to choose
between alternative statutes providing different punishments for the same
criminal act, exactly the situation condemned and held to violate equal
protection in Chavez and Sharpe.
Although Chavez and Sharpe provide the foundation for holding that
New Mexico's formulation of DMM violates the equal protection clause
of its constitution, and the discussion thus far has encompassed the thresh-
old question of whether equal protection under the New Mexico Consti-
tution is invoked, additional matters must be addressed to complete the
equal protection analysis. The next step of the analysis involves the
selection of an appropriate level of scrutiny and subjecting the statute to
the appropriate scrutiny.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recently embraced a three-tiered
approach to equal protection analysis, 3 yet it is unclear what level of
scrutiny New Mexico courts would apply to the DMM problem. Because
the death penalty is involved New Mexico courts would likely subject
the statute to strict scrutiny. After all, there is no more fundamental right
upon which all others are dependent than the right to one's life. Even
were the statute subjected to New Mexico's rational basis review follow-
ing McGeehan, the statute would fail the test of constitutionality. The
court in McGeehan examined closely whether the statute in question had
a fair and substantial relation to permissible state objectives. 3' With DMM
it is difficult to find a permissible state purpose not already served by
another statute. One cannot imagine that prosecutorial discretion con-
cerning the level and kind of punishment meted out for identical criminal
acts is a legitimate purpose, not only because it is unfair but because it
usurps the role of the judge or jury. Any other purpose related to criminal
statutes in general (such as the deterrence of crime, protection of citizens
from criminals acts, or retribution) is already served by the second degree
murder statute covering the same acts.
Given that the current formulation of DMM cannot be expected to
further a legitimate state purpose other than one already served by another
128. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
129. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
130. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
131. 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
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statute, and that it allows arbitrary imposition by the prosecutor of greatly
varying penalty schemes for the same criminal act, it can hardly be
imagined that the statute would survive New Mexico's rational basis
review of the kind conducted in McGeehan. Thus, under New Mexico's
equal protection doctrine, the current formulation of DMM must be held
invalid under the New Mexico Constitution.
A. Review at the Federal Level
Although a state court is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of
its laws, where there is a constitutional question the state court must be
concerned with the possibility of a review of its decision by the United
States Supreme Court. Because of the likelihood of an appeal in the event
the New Mexico Supreme Court held DMM violated the equal protection
clause of the New Mexico Constitution,'32 to avoid the possibility of
review on the merits, an opinion by the New Mexico Supreme Court
must be carefully drafted.
The concern in drafting such an opinion is to make it clear that the
decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds. The United
States Supreme Court has the authority to review state court judgments
involving federal questions, but has as a matter of course declined review
where the state court decision was based on adequate and independent
state grounds. 13 This restraint is in part a jurisdictional limitation on the
issuance of advisory opinions. '34
Until recently the United States Supreme Court engaged in a pre-
sumption of the independence of state grounds. '35 The Court did an about
face in Michigan v. Long where it declared that it would no longer presume
that the state ground was independent, but would presume state reliance
on federal constitutional law.'36 The Court stated "[i]f the state court
132. The New Mexico Supreme Court is not limited to addressing the question of the constitu-
tionality of DMM only in situtations where that issue has been raised at trial and preserved for
appeal. In a case where a defendant has been convicted of DMM only, he may raise that issue on
appeal for the first time since in that circumstance it is a jurisdictional issue. State v. McDuffie, 106
N.M. 120, 122, 739 P.2d 989, 991 (Ct. App. 1987), State v. Andazola, 95 N.M. 430, 431, 622
P.2d 1050, 1051 (Ct. App. 1981). In addition, on appeal the court may, sua sponte, raise the issue
of the constitutionality of a statute. State v. Parrillo, 94 N.M. 98, 99, 607 P.2d 636, 637 (Ct. App.
1979), State v. Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (Ct. App. 1972) (Sutin, J., dissenting).
133. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). See also Pollack, supra note 32.
134. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983).
135. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 128. See also Greenhalgh, supra note 71. The presumption was that
where a state court would render the same judgment after the Supreme Court corrected the state
court's interpretation of federal law, review would be declined.
136. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41. ("[W]e merely assume that there are no such grounds when it
is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state
ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law").
Id. at 1042.
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decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course,
will not undertake to review the decision. "'37 Paraphrasing its new policy,
the Court said it would have jurisdiction to review the case in the absence
of "a plain statement that the decision below rested on adequate and
independent state ground."' 38 Thus, there is now in effect a presumption
of jurisdiction in absence of such a plain statement.
The Court in Long provided some general language indicating guide-
lines for drafting state opinions that plainly rely on adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds. First, it made clear that references to the state
constitution alone are insufficient to overcome the assumption that the
decision did not rest on grounds independent of federal law. Second, the
Court indicated that citing state cases to support the state's holding would
be necessary but not sufficient. This is so because the Court apparently
reserved the right to determine its own understanding of the state law
relevent to the determination in the case below.'39 Finally the Court as-
serted that if a state cites federal cases, it may choose merely to rely on
those precedents as it would on the precedents of other jurisdictions, but
it must "make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that
the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and
do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.""
Delaware v. Van Arsdall ", is instructive concerning the application
of the standard announced in Long. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
defendant argued that jurisdiction to hear the appeal was lacking because
the Delaware Supreme Court had based its decision on an automatic
reversal rule adopted pursuant to the court's supervisory authority to
remedy a constitutional violation. '42 The United States Supreme Court
stated that because the Delaware Supreme Court opinion made no ref-
erence to any superintending authority and did not suggest even the
existence of a state rule, its opinion lacked the requisite plain statement
that it rested on state grounds under Michigan v. Long. ' Justice Stevens
argued in dissent that it was easier to presume an exercise of supervisory
power, given that the Court has always been liberal in allowing state
courts room to develop remedies for constitutional violations, and that
the majority opinion extended the scope of the presumption that a state
137. Id. at 1041.
138. Id. at 1044.
139. Id. at 1044 n.10.
140. Id. at 1041.
141. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
142. Id. at 678 n.3. The trial court judge had denied the defendant the right to cross examine a
prosecution witness concerning potential bias, and the Delaware Supreme Court held that such a
blanket prohibition against exploring bias of a witness was per se error. Id. at 677-78.
143. Id. at 678 n.3.
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court opinion rested on federal law beyond that of Michigan v. Long.'"
Thus even where it is clearly correct to assume that a state court's decision
is based in state law, absent a plain statement to that effect, the Court
will presume otherwise.
To minimize the possibility of review by the Supreme Court under the
standard announced in Michigan v. Long, a New Mexico opinion holding
that DMM is unconstitutional should be expressly based on the equal
protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution and on cases relying
on New Mexico equal protection grounds. The opinion should explicitly
state that it is fully apparent after a considered analysis, that the New
Mexico equal protection clause provides protection independent of and
more extensive in scope than its fourteenth amendment analogue, citing
the appropriate state cases.'45 In a best effort to preclude review by the
United States Supreme Court, the state court could avoid reference to
federal cases altogether." If any federal cases are. cited, however, the
opinion should make clear that these cases are consulted merely for
guidance and not as controlling precedent compelling any conclusion
reached by the court. In this regard, the statement made by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Ball'47 is instructive and should
satisfy the requirements of Michigan v. Long.'
V. THE FUTURE OF DEPRAVED MIND MURDER IN NEW MEXICO
Under the present murder statute, New Mexico courts must sooner or
later come to grips with the constitutional question whether the existing
formulation of DMM is invalid, but the legislature also has an obligation
to examine this problem. In fact, action by the legislature could obviate
the necessity of a judicial solution.
There is ample reason for the legislature to act. New Mexico is only
one of three states which treat what LaFave and Scott term "depraved
heart murder" as first degree murder. "' Most states that recognize "de-
praved heart murder" categorize it as a variety of second degree murder,
and twelve states do not recognize this form of murder at all. 5° In 1981
144. Id. at 689-701 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., Sharpe, Chavez, McGeehan, Chapman. To demonstrate the intent to develop
independent state constitutional doctrine the opinion should also clarify the dicta in Garcia and Sena
School Bus Co.
146. Pollock, supra note 32, at 992.
147. "We hereby make clear that when this court cites federal or other state court opinions in
construing provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes, we rely on those precedents
merely for guidance and do not consider our results bound by those decisions." 124 N.H. 226, 471
A.2d 247 (1983).
148. Pollock, supra note 32, at 982.
149. See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 8, § 7.7(d), at 244-45 & n.65.
150. Id. at §7.7(e), at 245, §7.4(a), at 201 & n.14.
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the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Marcy held that Colorado's
version of depraved mind murder, called "extreme indifference murder"
and classified as first degree murder, violated equal protection of the law
under the Colorado Constitution.' 5 ' The court stated that "the crime of
first degree murder by extreme indifference is not sufficiently distinguish-
able from second degree murder to warrant the substantial differential in
penalty authorized by the statutory scheme."' 52 In perspective New Mex-
ico is in a minority concerning its treatment of DMM, and that minority
is growing smaller. There are substantial reasons why this is so.
First, the DMM problem cannot be addressed in a vacuum. It is nec-
essary to examine the principles underlying our criminal justice system.
No New Mexico case law or existing state statutes focus on these prin-
ciples. However, presuming that one of the purposes of our criminal
system is to prescribe penalties in proportion to the seriousness of the
offense, that purpose is not served by prescribing two alternative and
drastically different penalty schemes for what is in effect the same offense.
If a general principle of criminal justice is that penalties should reflect
the degree of blameworthiness attached to a person's actions, our current
murder statute falls short.
Under New Mexico's current murder statute, not only can a person
committing the same criminal act be charged with one of two identically
defined crimes carrying substantially different penalties, but because in
New Mexico DMM is in effect a subspecies of SDM, a person committing
acts which intuitively appear more blameworthy than those of a person
charged or convicted of DMM will receive a substantially lesser penalty
if charged with SDM. For example, two persons firing shots into tractor
trailors and cabs at a carnival at 1:30 a.m. without intent to kill anyone
but nonetheless killing someone sleeping in one of the cabs, were sen-
tenced to life imprisonment under New Mexico's DMM law. '53 A person
driving through a police roadblock at a high rate of speed who after
having his tire blown out by a police bullet drove into a field without
attempting to stop the vehicle, striking and killing a person who happened
to be in the field, was also sentenced to life imprisonment. '4 However,
a person who intentionally (but without deliberation) shoots or stabs and
kills one or more persons, would upon conviction receive a maximum
sentence of twelve years imprisonment per killing. In the above examples,
how on a theory of blameworthiness can life imprisonment be justified
for the unintentional killings when a substantially lesser penalty is im-
posed for the person who intentionally kills?
151. 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981). See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text.
152. Id. at 72.
153. See State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 675 P.2d 120 (1984).
154. See State v. lbn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 694 P.2d 922 (1985).
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Another apparently absurd result under the present case law is that if
a person approaches a crowd of people intending to kill a particular
individual, and without deliberation pulls out a gun firing and killing that
individual, he can at most be convicted of SDM. However, if he misses
the person he intended to kill and kills another person in the crowd, he
can then be charged with first degree DMM and be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment."'5 Analogous to what Judge Payne pointed out in
his dissent in Jackson v. State, this accomplishes imposition of a penalty
for loss of life being meted out "not upon any well-reasoned principle
of law, but rather upon the accuracy of the aim of the person charged
with the killing."' 56 How can a criminal justice system justify the im-
position of a penalty of life imprisonment or death on the basis of a
defendant's aim where the physical consequences of an act and the mental
state of two defendants are otherwise identical?
One legislative solution to the problems caused by New Mexico's
current formulation of DMM would be to recognize that because DMM
is at present no more than a subspecies of SDM, that portion of the statute
pertaining to DMM can be repealed. Another option would be to revise
our murder statute to recognize a more useful and reasonable function
for DMM. For example DMM could be used to identify a form of second
degree unintentional murder more blameworthy than manslaughter. This
position is in line with the vast majority of jurisdictions recognizing a
form of DMM.
The approach of the Model Penal Code is instructive on this point.
Under the Model Penal Code, an unintentional killing is murder only if
it is "committed recklessly" and "under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life."' 57 The comment to this
section explains that recklessness here means an awareness of an unjus-
tifiable creation of substantial homicidal risk; and whereas recklessness
alone suffices for manslaughter, for murder the additional judgment must
be made whether the defendants conscious disregard of the risk was
"under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life."" 8
155. See State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 657 P.2d 128 (1983). Defendant, angered by a doorman
at a bar, retrieved a gun from his car, reentered the bar and fired at the doorman injuring the doorman
but also killing a bystander. The defendant was convicted of depraved mind murder. Id.
156. 92 N.M. 461, 462-63, 589 P.2d 1052, 1053-54 (1979). While we are not troubled when
accuracy of aim determines the penalty in the difference between murder and attempted murder, this
is because the accuracy of the aim is accompanied by different results which are considered different
in degree of moral culpability. However, in the case of DMM and SDM the result is the same, the
death of a person, and the penalty is then imposed on the fortuity or lack thereof of the defendant's
aim alone and not on the level of moral culpability attached to the physical consequences of the
defendant's act.
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l) (1980).
158. Id. at comment 4.
[Vol. 19
AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
LaFave and Scott point out that this allows an inquiry into the motives
of the person creating the risk. A person speeding through crowded streets
to rush someone to a hospital for an emergency operation may not be
guilty of murder if he unintentionally kills, though the same conduct done
solely for the purpose of experiencing the thrill may be enough for murder.'59
Under the Model Penal Code formulation of depraved heart murder
three things are clear. First, a particular degree of risk creation alone will
not suffice for murder; consequently the degree of risk of death required
for murder cannot be measured with precision. Second, the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's actions must be examined for a determination
of the social utility or lack thereof. Third, the amount of risk creation
necessary for murder may be less as the lack of social utility of a de-
fendant's conduct increases. The usefulness of this form of analysis for
DMM lies in that it serves to distinguish an increased level of blame-
worthiness for SDM from a case of ordinary manslaughter. What it does
not do is distinguish the level of blameworthiness associated with SDM
sufficient to create a form of first degree murder.
Another approach now in use in many states is to consider depravity
of mind as an aggravating circumstance in determining whether to sen-
tence a person convicted of first degree murder to death or life impris-
onment. "0 In this way, depravity of mind is not considered as an element
of the crime at all, but is rather considered solely in sentencing as an
added condition of blameworthiness. Generally, the use of "depravity"
in these statutes has been subject to a constitutional challenge on the basis
of vagueness which has succeeded in some cases. 6' Recent cases chal-
lenging the term for vagueness have generally held that the term is not
vague on its face, but that courts must be careful in its interpretation."'
Numerous options are available for dealing with depravity of mind in
a statutory homicide scheme. The present use of the concept in New
Mexico's murder statute is unworkable and violates equal protection under
the New Mexico Constitution. Although the short term solution is for
New Mexico courts to invalidate the DMM portion of New Mexico's
159. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 8, § 7.4(a), at 202.
160. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1977) ("especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(7) (1982) ("outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved ... depravity of mind"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(l)(d) (1985) ("exceptional
depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(8) (1986)
("the murder involved . . . depravity of mind"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982) ("The
murder ... involved . . . depravity of mind").
161. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). The Court held that the Supreme Court of
Georgia applied an overly broad interpretation of the phrase "depravity of mind." See also State v.
Chaplin, 433 A.2d 327 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981), writ dismissed, 433 A.2d 325, where the court held
that the language "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" was unconstitutionally vague.
162. See, e.g., Neuschafer v. State, 101 Nev. 331, 705 P.2d 609 (1985); State v. Williams, 690
S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1985).
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murder statute, the legislature should act to use the concept in a more
sensible manner if the concept is to be retained at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that the elements of first degree depraved mind murder and
second degree murder are indistinguishable under New Mexico law, means
that people committing identical criminal acts may be subject to radically
different penalties at the discretion of the prosecutor. While this does not
create an equal protection problem under the United States Constitution,
New Mexico case law indicates that it does create an equal protection
problem under the New Mexico Constitution.
The New Mexico cases so holding are consistent with the concept that
state constitutions provide protections independent of and which may
exceed those afforded by the federal constitution. In fact, federalism
dictates that state constitutions provide a separate level of protection
against the abuses of governmental power. To this end state judiciary
bodies that develop law interpreting and applying the provisions of their
constitutions fulfill their distinct functional roles in our federalist system.
This role, distinct from that of federal judiciary bodies, includes a greater
response to local circumstances, focusing more closely on the content of
constitutional rights, greater integration into the policy making process
of states, and the creation of a diversity of constitutional doctrine, in
effect serving as laboratories for the further development of constitutional
law at both the state and federal level. Independent interpretation of the
provisions of state constitutions is justified and inspired by the dictates
of federalism, and is not dependent upon textual differences between state
provisions and their federal counterparts.
In the area of equal protection, state courts have been slow to develop
doctrine independent of federal doctrine. New Mexico, however, has
made clear that its equal protection clause provides rights and protections
independent of the United States Constitution. Although New Mexico
courts have borrowed the form of analysis and terminology used in federal
equal protection cases, they have applied the federal tests more rigorously,
and have, in addition, placed an emphasis on arbitrariness in the appli-
cation of state laws. The protection afforded under New Mexico's equal
protection doctrine can be viewed as a natural outgrowth of its heritage
and history involving equality issues.
Applying New Mexico's equal protection doctrine to the problem of
depraved mind murder, it is clear that equal protection is violated because
the current formulation of depraved mind murder makes certain that there
will be arbitrary enforcement. This is so because the decision a prosecutor
makes in determining whether to charge a defendant with depraved mind
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murder or second degree murder, where the facts are sufficient to charge
defendant with either, can only be based on the degree of punishment
available. A New Mexico court holding that depraved mind murder vi-
olates equal protection under the New Mexico Constitution must be con-
cerned with review at the federal level, and must, therefore, draft a careful
opinion making clear that its decision is based on "adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds" as that standard is currently interpreted.
Whether or not the New Mexico judiciary issues an opinion in the near
future holding the current statutory formulation of depraved mind murder
to be unconstitutional, the state legislature must also concern itself with
a useful role for the concept of depravity of mind in a murder scheme.
Depravity of mind is best used as a concept employed to define a species
of second degree murder providing an increased level of blameworthiness
above that of manslaughter. Another useful approach, however, has been
to use depravity of mind as an aggravating circumstance in determining
whether to impose the death penalty on persons convicted of first degree
murder. Regardless of the approach ultimately taken in New Mexico, the
current formulation of depraved mind murder must be abandoned either
as a matter of state constitutional law or by legislative repeal.
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